Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Annual Report 2019
Definitions: investigatory powers
Targeted equipment interference:
This is the process by which an individual’s electronic equipment may be interfered with to
obtain information or communication. Activity could include remote access to a computer or
covertly downloading mobile phone contents.
Property interference:
Examples of this is where there is a need to covertly interfere with physical property, such
as goods, but it is also used for trespass to land in order to avoid civil or criminal liability: for
example, trespassing to install a listening device in a person’s house.
Surveillance:
Surveillance can be either directed or intrusive. Directed surveillance is covert but not carried
out in residential premises or private vehicles, this could include the covert monitoring
of a person/people of interest. Intrusive surveillance is carried out, for example, using
eavesdropping devices in residential premises or in a private vehicle.
Covert human intelligence sources:
A Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) is an individual who supports the functions of
certain public authorities by providing intelligence covertly on a person of interest with whom
they have a personal or other relationship. A CHIS under the age of 18 is referred to as a
Juvenile CHIS.
Communications data:
Communications data is the who, where, when and how of a communication but not
its content.
Judicial Commissioners
7.3
During 2019 Judicial Commissioners (JCs) have continued to play a part in some inspections,
either as an observer or as part of the inspection team. Some of the notable inspections
involving JCs have been Police Scotland, the National Crime Agency (NCA), Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Greater Manchester Police, and Her Majesty’s Prison
and Probation Service (HMPPS). Where possible, we have aimed to align the inspections
with a JC’s particular portfolio interests, such as for Dame Linda Dobbs who has a special
interest in custodial matters both here and overseas. Feedback from the JCs has shown
that joining these inspections has enabled them to see beyond the documentary aspects of
investigations in which they may have been asked to approve a warrant. This has enhanced
their understanding and appreciation of the operational considerations and challenges
faced by officers and helped them understand the evolution of the broader investigation, of
which the covert activity might be just one aspect.
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