CHAPTER 7: PRACTICE
7.34.
Before they consider a warrant, Secretaries of State receive advice from civil servants
in the WGDs. The WGDs have what IOCCO has called a “guardian and gatekeeper
role”.26 The majority of warrants are considered by the Home Office, in which the
National Security Unit headed by a senior civil servant with 14 staff, provides roundthe-clock support to the Home Secretary, and any other Secretary of State who is
considering a warrant in her absence. The equivalent unit in the FCO the Intelligence
Policy Department, is also headed by a senior civil servant and has two staff who
support the warrant process and four more who may be involved from time to time.
The Northern Ireland Office and Scottish Government have similar staff. Though
subordinate to the approving Ministers, these are all independent of the warrantseeking agency. They ensure that legal and policy advice on the warrant is taken
where needed and that the warranty process is properly managed, including
arranging, where justified, for the urgency procedures to be followed.
Handling of intercepted material
7.35.
There are restrictions on the dissemination of intercepted material. These are set out
in RIPA, ss15, 16 and 19, the Interception Code and in detailed arrangements drawn
up for each intercepting agency and approved by the Secretary of State. Where
possible only a summary and not the detail of intercepted communication should be
disseminated. Intercepted material will often inform an intelligence report; but the raw
material will be shared with as few people as possible.
7.36.
Because intercepted material cannot be used in evidence, there is generally no need
for it to be retained by the intercepting agency once its immediate use in providing
intelligence is fulfilled. It is therefore destroyed at the end of the retention period, a
process overseen by IOCCO.27 There are number of grounds, largely concerned with
oversight and audit, on which intercepted material can be retained for longer than the
standard period.28
26
27
28
o
o
o
o
o
IOCC Report, (March 2015), para 6.48.
IOCC Report, (March 2015), paras 6.60-6.65.
These include:
if the intercepted material continues to be, or is likely to become, necessary for any of the purposes set
out in RIPA s5(3) – namely, in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting
serious crime, for the purpose of safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the UK;
if the intercepted material is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of the functions of the Secretary
of State under RIPA Part I Chapter 1;
if the intercepted material is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of any functions of the IOCC or
the IPT;
if the intercepted material is necessary to ensure that a person conducting a criminal prosecution has
the information he needs to determine what is required of him by his duty to secure the fairness of the
prosecution;
if the intercepted material is necessary for the performance of any duty imposed by the Public Record
Acts.
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