CHAPTER 7: PRACTICE
7.17.
Of the warrants issued in 2014:
(a)
68% were issued on serious crime grounds,
(b)
31% were issued on national security grounds (which many of which would
include terrorist investigations), and
(c)
1% were issued on a combination of grounds.
7.18.
Some recent examples of the use of interception in the criminal sphere were published
in December 2014, as part of the review of intercepted material as evidence.16 They
relate to the importation of Class A drugs, the supply and distribution of firearms,
conflict between organised crime groups, money-laundering and fraud. They are
reproduced at Annex 8 to this Report.
7.19.
The Secretary of State for Defence gives the authority for interception by MoD under
s8(1) warrants. This is a limited activity. The MoD conducts interception in the UK,
targeted at its own communication, to enable equipment development and training for
use in military operations. Material intercepted as part of a training activity is treated
in accordance with RIPA s15 and deleted when it is no longer necessary or
proportionate to retain it. Interception in the UK authorised by the Secretary of State
for Defence may very rarely be needed to meet current military intelligence
requirements.
Bulk interception
7.20.
Bulk interception by GCHQ is used to support Government activities in the fields of
foreign affairs, defence, including cyber defence, serious crime and counter-terrorism.
It contributes to about 55% of the intelligence reports GCHQ produces.17 The legal
framework in which GCHQ operates and the applicable safeguards are summarised
in Chapter 6: for a fuller treatment, the reader is referred to the very recent reports of
the ISC18 and IOCCO.19
7.21.
A bulk warrant under RIPA s8(4) is targeted at a telecommunications system and
therefore, in effect, targets communications bearers rather than specific, individual
communications. There were 20 s8(4) warrants in place at the end of 2014.
Interception under the WTA 2006 targets standalone communication systems such
as those that may support military systems and private radio communications.
16
17
18
19
Intercept as Evidence.
Evidence from GCHQ, April 2015.
ISC Privacy and Security Report, chapters 4 and 5.
IOCC Report (March 2015), chapter 6. There is also fuller detail in the IOCC Report, (April 2014),
sections 3 and 6.
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