ANNEX 15: THE LAW OF THE FIVE EYES
security of Canada or is essential to identify, isolate or prevent harm to the
Canadian Government’s computer systems.
(b)
At the expiry of an authorisation, CSE must report to the Ministry of National
Defence explaining what Canadian communications were retained and on what
basis.65
(c)
When CSE shares information with its global partners, the names of any
Canadian are redacted and only reinstated at the specific request of a partner
country and after CSE has satisfied itself that the requesting government
department has proper authority and justification to make the request.66
New Zealand
The Security and Intelligence Service
58.
NZSIS is New Zealand’s equivalent of MI5, and is governed by the New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 [SISA 1979].
59.
Like Canada, America (and to some extent Australia), New Zealand provides for judicial
oversight of the warrant process at the point of authorisation. However, unlike those
countries, that oversight is provided by a retired High Court Judge, the Commissioner
of Security Warrants. The Commissioner is a creature of statute, created in 1999.67
60.
Domestic warrant applications are jointly signed off by both the Minister and the
Commissioner. The applicant must provide sworn witness evidence that the
interception is necessary for the detection of activities prejudicial to security or for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information essential to security. They must
also provide evidence that any communication sought to be intercepted is not privileged
and that the information is not be obtained by any other means.68
61.
Foreign intelligence warrants operate differently. Firstly, the Commissioner is not
involved in their authorisation. Secondly, as well as satisfying the conditions above,
NZSIS must demonstrate that that there are reasonable grounds for believing that no
New Zealand citizen or permanent resident is to be identified by the proposed warrant
as a person who is to be subject to the warrant and that any place to be specified in
the proposed warrant is occupied by a foreign organisation or a foreign person.
62.
Whether internal or foreign, intelligence warrants must specify the type of
communication to be intercepted, the identity of the persons (if known) whose
communications are sought to be intercepted and (if not known) the place or facility in
respect of which communications may be intercepted.69 Given the restrictive nature of
those requirements, it is unlikely that NZSIS has any power to carry out bulk
interception.
65
Ibid., p. 14-15.
Ibid., p. 27.
SISA 1979 s5A.
SISA 1979 s4A.
SISA 1979 s4B.
66
67
68
69
360