CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
for such relatively straightforward tasks as tracing the maker of a 999
(emergency) call, or a “reverse look-up” to identify any mobile phones
registered to a particular postal address.
(b)
1.16.
Some powers are used (and were always intended to be used) by a wide range
of public authorities, from the National Crime Agency [NCA] to local authorities,
and for a host of purposes including murder investigations, the tracing of
missing persons, the investigation of organised crime, the detection of cyber
crime (including child sexual exploitation and online fraud) and the enforcement
of trading standards.
It would be unfortunate if my association with the review of terrorism laws were to fuel
the common misconception that investigatory powers are designed solely or even
principally to fight terrorism. They have a vital part to play in that fight, as this Report
will set out. But they are properly and productively used both in a broader national
security context (e.g. counter-espionage, counter-proliferation) and in combating a
wide range of other crimes, most of them more prevalent than terrorism and some of
them just as capable of destroying lives.
Structure of this Report
1.17.
21
22
The structure of this Report should be evident from the Contents. In summary:
(a)
Part I introduces the task, explores the central concept of privacy and
discharges my statutory function of reviewing “current and future threats to the
United Kingdom” and “the challenges of changing technologies”.21
(b)
Part II explains the current position, touching on legal constraints before
summarising existing powers and how they are used by the authorities. It also
seeks to provide some alternative reference points by looking at other types of
surveillance by public authorities, the laws of other countries and the use of
communications data by private companies.
(c)
Part III seeks to summarise the views expressed to the Review by the four main
groups which submitted evidence to the Review: law enforcement, intelligence,
service providers and civil society.
(d)
Part IV explains and sets out my recommendations for change. Drawing on
previous parts of the Report, it incorporates my conclusions on “the capabilities
needed to combat those threats”, “safeguards to protect privacy”, “issues
relating to transparency and oversight” and “the effectiveness of existing
legislation (including its proportionality) and the case for new or amending
legislation”.22
DRIPA 2014, s7(a)(d).
DRIPA 2014, s7(b)(c)(e)(f).
21