CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
39
accordance with a permit (see paragraph 36 above). The Court also has
regard to the fact that the permits in question concern the collection of
intelligence related to threats to national security and are not targeting
individuals suspected of criminal conduct, in which case the need for
specific provisions on the cancellation of permits would have been more
prominent. Moreover, as noted by the Data Protection Authority
(paragraph 60), the FRA continuously reviews whether the specific personal
data it has intercepted is still needed for its signals intelligence activities. In
these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that there are safeguards in place
which adequately regulate the duration, renewal and cancellation of
interception measures.
(iv) Authorisation of secret surveillance measures
(α) The parties’ submissions
131. The applicant submitted that, although signals intelligence could
not be conducted without prior authorisation by the Foreign Intelligence
Court, the court’s impartiality and independence from the Government
could be questioned and its activities were covered by complete secrecy. Its
hearings and decisions had never been made public. The same was true for
information about the number of hearings, the number of permits granted or
rejected, any reasoning of its decisions or the amount or type of search
terms being used. As to the composition of the court, its members were
elected for a limited period of time, except for the president.
132. The Government emphasised that all signals intelligence conducted
required a permit from the Foreign Intelligence Court, including the FRA’s
development activities. The Government also stressed that the court was
independent from Parliament and public authorities. Although its activities
were governed by secrecy, a privacy protection representative was present
to safeguard the interests of individuals.
(β) The Court’s assessment
133. As the Court has previously held, the authorisation of telephone
tapping by a non-judicial authority may be compatible with the Convention
(see, for example, Klass and Others, cited above, § 51; and Weber and
Saravia, cited above, § 115), provided that that authority is sufficiently
independent from the executive (Roman Zakharov, cited above, § 258).
However, the rule of law implies, inter alia, that an interference by the
executive authorities with an individual’s rights should be subject to an
effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least
in the last resort, judicial control normally offering the best guarantees of
independence, impartiality and a proper procedure (Klass and Others, cited
above, §§ 55 and 56). Prior judicial authorisation may serve to limit the
authorities’ discretion in interpreting the scope of mandating and