34
CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
society”, in particular by providing for adequate and effective safeguards
and guarantees against abuse (Roman Zakharov, § 236).
(b) Existing case-law on the bulk interception of communications
108. The Court has considered the Convention compatibility of regimes
which expressly permit the bulk interception of communications on two
occasions: first in Weber and Saravia v. Germany ((dec.), no. 54934/00,
ECHR 2006-XI), and then in Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom
(no. 58243/00, 1 July 2008).
109. In Weber and Saravia the applicants complained about the process
of strategic monitoring under the amended G10 Act, which authorised the
monitoring of international wireless telecommunications. Signals emitted
from foreign countries were monitored by interception sites situated on
German soil with the aid of certain catchwords which were listed in the
monitoring order. Only communications containing these catchwords were
recorded and used. Having particular regard to the six “minimum
safeguards” (see paragraph 103 above), the Court considered that there
existed adequate and effective guarantees against abuses of the State’s
strategic monitoring powers. It therefore declared the applicants’ Article 8
complaints to be manifestly ill-founded.
110. In Liberty and Others the Court was considering the regime under
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 which allowed the executive
to intercept communications passing between the United Kingdom and an
external receiver. At the time of issuing an interception warrant, the
Secretary of State was required to issue a certificate containing a description
of the intercepted material which he considered should be examined. On the
face of the 1985 Act, external communications sent to or from an address in
the United Kingdom could only be included in the certificate if the
Secretary of State considered it necessary for the prevention or detection of
acts of terrorism. Otherwise, the legislation provided that material could be
contained in a certificate, and thus listened to or read, if the Secretary of
State considered that this was required in the interests of national security,
the prevention of serious crime or the protection of the United Kingdom’s
economy. The Court held that the domestic law at the relevant time did not
indicate with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against
abuse of power, the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion
conferred on the State to intercept and examine external communications. In
particular, it did not set out in a form accessible to the public any indication
of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing,
storing and destroying intercepted material.
(c) Application of these principles to the facts of the case
111. It has not been disputed by the parties that the Swedish signals
intelligence, in its present structure, has a basis in domestic law.