CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
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meaning of Article 8. However, it can be said that its mail and other
communications are covered by the notion of “correspondence” which
applies equally to communications originating from private and business
premises. Moreover, applicants who are legal persons may fear that they are
subjected to secret surveillance and it has accordingly been accepted that
they may claim to be victims (see Association for European Integration and
Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, no. 62540/00, § 60,
28 June 2007, with further references). It is therefore appropriate to examine
the complaint under the right to respect for the applicant’s correspondence.
86. Considering that the Government’s objection on victim status is
closely linked to the substance of the applicant’s complaint, it must be
joined to the merits.
87. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It is
not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
1. The applicant’s victim status and the existence of an interference
(a) The parties’ submissions
88. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a
victim of a violation of the Convention by the mere existence of legislation
concerning signals intelligence. The aggregate of control mechanisms,
supervisory elements and remedies available constituted sufficient
safeguards against abuse of the FRA’s competence to conduct signals
intelligence. Furthermore, the possibility that the applicant had been subject
to signals intelligence was virtually non-existent.
89. The applicant disagreed with the Government and remarked, with
reference to the case of Kennedy v. the United Kingdom (no. 26839/05,
18 May 2010), that its victim status was based on the risk of secret
surveillance measures having been applied.
(b) The Court’s assessment
90. In the Roman Zakharov v. Russia judgment ([GC], no. 47143/06,
§ 171, ECHR 2015), which concerned covert interception of mobile
telephone communications, the Court, adopting the Kennedy approach,
clarified the conditions under which an applicant can claim to be a victim of
a violation of Article 8 without having to prove that secret surveillance
measures have in fact been applied to him or her specifically. Accordingly,
the Court accepts that an applicant can claim to be the victim of a violation
occasioned by the mere existence of secret surveillance measures, or