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CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT
activities. It also noted that the FRA continuously reviewed whether data
intercepted was still needed for those purposes. A similar review was made
concerning the carriers from which the FRA obtained intelligence.
Moreover, there was nothing to indicate that the provisions on destruction
of personal data had been disregarded (see paragraphs 25-27 above).
However, the FRA was criticised for not adequately monitoring logs used to
detect unwarranted use of personal data, a shortcoming that had been
pointed out already in 2010.
L. The report of the Signals Intelligence Committee
61. On 12 February 2009 the Government also decided to appoint a
committee predominantly composed of members of parliament, the Signals
Intelligence Committee (Signalspaningskommittén), with the task of
monitoring the signals intelligence conducted at the FRA in order to
examine the implications for personal integrity. The report was presented on
11 February 2011 (Uppföljning av signalspaningslagen; SOU 2011:13). The
Committee’s examination had its main focus on signals intelligence
conducted over the airways as such activities on cable-based traffic had not
yet commenced on a larger scale.
62. The Committee concluded that concerns of personal integrity were
taken seriously by the FRA and formed an integral part of the development
of its procedures. It noted, however, that there were practical difficulties in
separating domestic cable-based communications from those crossing the
Swedish border. Any domestic communications that were not separated at
the automated stage were instead separated manually at the processing or
analysing stage. The Committee further observed that the search terms used
for communications data were less specific than those used for interception
of the content of a communication and that, consequently, a larger number
of individuals could have such data stored by the FRA.
63. Another finding in the report was that the FRA’s development
activities (see paragraph 14 above) could lead to non-relevant
communications being intercepted and possibly read or listened to by FRA
personnel. However, the Committee noted that the development activities
were directly essential for the FRA’s ability to conduct signals intelligence.
Moreover, information obtained through the development activities could be
used in the regular intelligence activities only if such use conformed with
the purposes established by law and the relevant tasking directives issued
for the signals intelligence.
64. Like the Data Protection Authority (see paragraph 59 above), the
Committee pointed out that, in reality, the obligation of the FRA to notify
individuals that had been directly and personally subjected to secret
surveillance measures was very limited due to secrecy; it concluded
therefore that this obligation served no purpose as a guarantee for legal