176.
Finally, there is no meaningful regulation or oversight of the use of
selectors and search criteria to select particular intercepted material for
inspection. With the exception of the limited restriction in s16(2), neither
RIPA nor the Code provide any guidance as to what constitutes
appropriate selectors and search criteria. Nor is there any requirement for
search terms to be specified in the s 8(4) warrant or the certificate. This is
in contrast to the position in Weber where the search terms had to be
specifically identified in the monitoring order and were subject to review
and approval by the G10 Commission.106
177.
In light of the generic nature of the certificate, the ISC “sought assurance
that “the application of simple selectors and initial search criteria, and
then complex searches which determine what communications are
examined” are “subject to scrutiny and review by Ministers and/or the
Commissioners.” However, it found that, “neither Ministers nor the
Commissioners have any significant visibility of these issues.” By way of
example, it highlighted that “neither were aware that the number of
‘selection rules’…had doubled between March and November 2014.”107
178.
The absence of effective oversight or approval of the filtering, storage and
analysis of intercepted material is reflected by the IPT’s third judgment in
June 2016, which found that communications of one of the Applicants –
the South African Legal Resources Centre – had been initially intercepted,
extracted, filtered and stored. The IPT specifically found that “the
procedure laid down by GCHQ’s internal policies for selection of the
communications for examination was in error not followed”.108 Even if
other NGOs and individuals had suffered the same detriment, they would
not have any remedy, unless they had the good fortune of blindly bringing
a claim before the IPT.
See s3(2) of the G10 Act and Weber, §32.
ISC Report, paras 123-125.
108 Third IPT Judgment, para 15.
106
107
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