intercepted, again and again, for an indefinite period under successive
s8(4) warrants. The s9(6) time limits are therefore effectively meaningless.
4.
The procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the
data obtained
171.
The procedure for filtering, storing and analysing intercepted material
lacks adequate safeguards and gives rise to an unacceptable risk of
arbitrary or disproportionate interference with Articles 8 and 10.
172.
First, the “safeguards” under s16 of RIPA do not apply to communications
data. Thus, as the Independent Reviewer has noted, “communications
data…may be selected and reviewed according to a factor which is referable
to an individual who is known for the time being to be in the British
Islands”.100 The ISC Report also noted that the s16 “safeguards” do not
apply to
communications
data
and
that, accordingly, “UK-to-UK
[communications data] will be in the pool of Communications Data that
GCHQ collect, and may be returned as a result of searches against that
pool.”101 The revelations regarding the GCHQ programmes KARMA
POLICE, Black Hole and MUTANT BROTH provide troubling examples of
how the Government makes use of such data to produce automated
profiles (Factual Appendix, paras 4-9).
173.
Secondly, the Government relies on the certificate issued by the Secretary
of State as an additional constraint on the scope of filtering and analysis.
But, as discussed above, the certificate is expressed in such broad terms as
to provide no meaningful limitation.
174.
Thirdly, while s16(2) of RIPA provides that intercepted material cannot be
selected for examination “otherwise than according to a factor” which is
“referable to an individual who is known to be for the time being in the
100
101
A Question of Trust, para 6.76.
ISC Report, paras 145-146.
67