be the target of initial interception under RIPA and the terms of a
warrant or its certificate have no practical effect. In reality, every
person’s communications could be collected in the execution of
almost any warrant, if that collection can be justified under s5(6).
166.
These implications also have significance insofar as data collected
pursuant to s5(6) is extracted, filtered, stored, analysed and disseminated
in relation to the other Weber criteria considered below.
167.
The Government further contends that there are substantive limitations
on the categories of people whose information can be selected for
examination (Observations, §§4.43-4.48). It relies on the certificates that
the Secretary of State issues to authorise selection of information
intercepted under s8(4). But the Secretary of State has only ever issued a
single certificate, which applies to all 18 of the s8(4) warrants in existence
the time of the March 2015 ISC Report. The ISC Report described the
single certificate as “expressed in very general terms”, “generic”,
“unnecessarily ambiguous” and liable to “be misinterpreted”.97 It noted, for
example, that “the categories of information” that it authorises GCHQ to
examine include “[m]aterial providing intelligence on terrorism” and
related to “safeguarding economic well-being and the prevention and
detection of serious crime”.98 In addition, it highlighted that the certificate
also included the category of “strategic environmental issues”, the true
scope of which is very difficult to comprehend.99
168.
In contrast, the regime in Weber was clearer and more focused. As
discussed above, the G10 Act only permitted the interception of
international wireless telephone communications, which comprised only
10% of the total volume of telecommunications. The legislation further
narrowed
that
category
down
ISC Report, paras 101, 103.
ISC Report, paras 101-102.
99 ISC Report, paras 102-103.
97
98
65
to
persons
taking
part
in
such