2.
The categories of people liable to have their communications
intercepted
161.
In Szabó the Court stated that this criterion requires “the authorities to
demonstrate the actual or premised relation between the persons or range
of persons ‘concerned’ and the prevention of any…threat” (§67).
162.
The Government fails to draw any connection between the persons liable
to have their communications initially intercepted under s8(4) and the
“prevention of any…threat”, because any person is liable to have their
communications intercepted under s8(4).
163.
Instead, the Government suggests that, at the initial interception stage,
the focus of s8(4) on external communications provides a meaningful
limitation (Observations, §4.42). However the Government then admits
that the s8(4) Regime does not impose any limits on the “types” or
“numbers” of external communications that can be initially intercepted
and
“may
in
principle
authorise
the
interception
of
internal
communications insofar as that is necessary in order to intercept the
external communications.” In practice, this means that the Government
initially intercepts all communications (external and internal) that transit
across the cables it intercepts.96 Moreover, as discussed above, the
Government’s own definition of “external” captures many communications
that seem “internal”, including messages between two UK residents using
a platform such as Facebook. The categories and numbers of people whose
communications could be initially intercepted under a s8(4) warrant is
therefore inadequately controlled by the law.
164.
The Government’s admission that a s8(4) warrant “may in principle
authorise the interception of internal communications” stems from an
For a further discussion on the difficulty in distinguishing between external and internal
communications, see the Additional Submissions at para 45.
96
63