120.
On 9 October 2014, the IPT notified the Applicants that it had “concluded
that there was closed material relied upon by the [Government] which
could be disclosed to the parties”. The Applicants subsequently received an
untitled “note”, appearing to summarise some of the Government’s secret
arrangements governing its intelligence sharing regime. The Government
later produced several new versions of the note.
121.
On 5 December 2014, the IPT issued its first of three judgments, which
held, inter alia, that there was “no contravention of Articles 8 or 10 by
reference to” the bulk interception or intelligence sharing regimes.
122.
On 6 February 2015, the IPT issued its second judgment, which held that,
“prior to the disclosures made and referred to in the Tribunal’s
Judgment of 5 December 2014, the regime governing the soliciting,
receipt, storing and transmitting by UK authorities of private
communications of individuals located in the UK, which have been
obtained by US authorities…contravened Articles 8 or 10 ECHR,
but now complies”.79
123.
On 22 June 2015, the IPT issued its third judgment. The IPT found that
the “email communications” of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights
“were lawfully and proportionately intercepted and accessed, pursuant to
s.8(4) of RIPA” but that “the time limit for retention permitted under the
internal policies of GCHQ…was overlooked in regard to the product of that
interception, such that it was retained for materially longer than permitted
under those policies.” The IPT determined that “the breach constitutes…a
breach of Article 8 ECHR” and ordered GCHQ “to destroy any of
the…communications that were retained for longer than the relevant
retention time limit.”.
124.
The IPT further found that “communications from an email address
associated with” the South African Legal Resources Centre were lawfully
79
Liberty et al. v. GCHQ et al., [2015] 3 AER 212, 6 Feb. 2015, para 23 (“Second IPT Judgment”).
49