complicated”, “difficult to understand” and “unnecessarily secretive”.64 The
ISC accordingly expressed “serious concerns about the resulting lack of
transparency, which is not in the public interest.”65 In particular, the ISC
criticised the absence of express powers governing major surveillance
activities, noting specifically that “it is inappropriate that many key
capabilities – for example, the exchange of intelligence with international
partners – are implicitly authorised rather than formally defined in
statute”.66 The ISC concluded that a “fundamental review” of the existing
framework is “overdue” 67 and that “the entire legal framework governing
the intelligence and security Agencies needs replacing”.68
110.
The Independent Reviewer Report echoed the serious concerns expressed
by the ISC about the fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework
governing surveillance and interception powers. With respect to RIPA, in
particular, the Independent Reviewer described it as “complex, fragmented
and opaque” and “extraordinarily difficult to understand and to apply.”69
He further observed that “RIPA has been overtaken by developments in
technology, such that in the view of many it is no longer fit for purpose” and
that the “distinctions laid out in the regime are increasingly defunct,
particularly in light of powerful tools for composite analysis.”70 He
concluded that “[t]his state of affairs is undemocratic, unnecessary and – in
the long run – intolerable.”71
111.
The Independent Reviewer also commented on the failure of existing legal
and political oversight to inform the public about the nature of the
Government’s surveillance techniques. He noted: “Intelligence is said to
have been harvested and shared in ways that neither Parliament nor
ISC Report, pp 2, 103, para 275.
ISC Report, p 2.
66 ISC Report, p 7.
67 ISC Report, pp 8, 118, para WW.
68 ISC Report, p 8.
69 A Question of Trust, para 12.20.
70 A Question of Trust, para 12.24.
71 A Question of Trust, para 35.
64
65
46