3.
The Interception of Communications Commissioner
106.
The IOCC is only in a position to provide limited post facto oversight of the
Government’s interception activities. In particular, the Applicants
emphasise that the IOCC’s position is part-time. In 2014, the Home
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, in remarking on this point,
noted that it had “some sympathy with the assertion…that the
Commissioners are good people doing impossible jobs.”62 It ultimately
concluded that it had “serious doubts that…the [IOCC] role…should be
part-time” and recommended that the position be made full-time.63
107.
The Applicants further note that the IOCC has no power to refer a case to
the IPT for a remedy. Nor is he permitted to notify the victim of any
excessive or unlawful interception. The Applicants discuss these points
further in its analysis of its Article 8 claim below.
D.
Recognition that the current legal framework is inaccessible,
outdated and unfit for purpose
108.
Since the IPT delivered its judgments in December 2014 and February
2015, a number of detailed reviews have been undertaken by Parliament,
the Independent Reviewer, RUSI and various European Union and
Council of Europe bodies. Those reports consistently acknowledge that the
existing legal frameworks for the bulk interception and intelligence
sharing lack transparency are unfit for purpose and require overhaul.
109.
In March, June, and July 2015, the ISC, Independent Reviewer and RUSI
respectively published reports on the effectiveness of existing legislation
relating to the Government’s investigatory powers. The ISC Report
observed that the UK’s existing legal framework regulating Government
surveillance powers “has developed piecemeal” and is “unnecessarily
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Counter-terrorism, HC 231, 9 May 2014, para
165. Reply Annex No. 15.
63 Ibid., para 167.
62
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