cables allows the Government access to an enormous amount of data
relating to the lives of private individuals around the world, the vast
majority of whom are not and never will be of legitimate interest to UK
intelligence services.
42.
It is only after having initially intercepted specific cables and extracting
the data flowing through each cable in bulk that the Government applies
its “selection rules” (Observations, §1.26(1)). The development of modern
search tools and artificial intelligence techniques mean that the UK
Intelligence Services can store and trawl through a large pool of
information, querying and disseminating it by reference to unknown
selectors that may bear little resemblance to criminal investigations or
operations. Until recently, such bulk interception would have been
difficult or impossible to analyse.
43.
Even at the filtering stage, the s8(4) Regime involves bulk intrusion. The
Government claims that its selectors “relate to individual targets” but this
is just one example of the range of selectors that may be used
(Observations, §1.26(1)).20 For instance, a selector could be used to identify
everyone who had read a particular book or newspaper article.
44.
People never used to read books, magazines or newspapers using a
computer, telephone or electronic tablet. Reading material is now
communicated over the internet, and therefore subject to bulk interception
under the s8(4) Regime. The effect of bulk interception is for the state to
store and analyse the reading habits of the population.
45.
The interception of such records by the state poses a serious risk to
privacy and freedom of expression. Reading is in the nature of a private
See, generally, Report of the Bulk Powers Review, paras 5.1-5.7, referencing the utility of bulk
interception not solely to target specific targets using strict selectors, but also to lead to “building
block” information which can then be used for new target development and to cultivate better
understanding of broader “intelligence threats and opportunities”. Reply Annex No. 32.
20
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