journalistic sources exists prior to the handing over of such material
capable of disclosing the sources’ identity” (§90).
292.
Compounding this deficiency, the regimes lack any effective, independent
and impartial post-factum review of decisions to access privileged NGO
communications. The IPT neither offers nor performs an effective review
function, as explained above.
293.
The Government insists in its Observations that its Code contains
sufficient safeguards concerning journalistic material. But these alleged
safeguards are nothing more than restatements of “considerations” which
may be taken into account.143 The Code does not address NGOs’ privileged
communications.
294.
The Applicants also submit that the subjection of human rights NGOs’
privileged communications to s8(4) surveillance or intelligence sharing is
neither a necessary nor a proportionate restriction on their Article 10
rights. Both regimes put human rights NGOs’ public watchdog role and
functions at risk by exerting a chilling effect on them and those with
whom they communicate. (mutatis mutandis, Nordisk Film & TV A/S v.
Denmark, App. no. 40485/02, 8 Dec. 2005144). It also raises risks to the
safety, well-being and life of victims of serious human rights violations
that work with human rights NGOs.
Code of Practice, §4.2.
The Court accepted the possibility that the compulsory handover of research material might
have a chilling effect on the exercise of journalistic freedom of expression and was therefore in
breach of Article 10.
143
144
113