review of the decisions or actions relating to access to his PNR
data.”
(3)
62.
Notification to those affected
This requirement is, as Mr de la Mare points out, expressly subject, in
paragraph 121 of the Judgment, to the proviso “as soon as that notification is
no longer liable to jeopardize the investigations being undertaken by those
authorities”, but this is in our judgment plainly inadequate as a proviso in the
circumstances of national security:
a. The context in Watson is plainly of a particular criminal investigation,
which has come to an end. The need to protect national security is ongoing, as, sadly, is the continuing involvement of large numbers of
people in the planning and execution of terrorist activities.
b. The danger of notification is not simply related to the circumstances of
a particular investigation or a particular person involved in that
investigation, but relates also to further operations, including both the
methodology of the obtaining or using of the information and the
identity of those involved.
63.
We have considered this suggested safeguard, not least because it is referred to
in Weber (2008) 46 EHRR SE5, in a number of our previous decisions and
found that it is not required for compliance with the ECHR. Mengozzi AG is
plainly of the same view (paragraph 271, cited above).
It would in our
judgment be very damaging to national security.
64.
In any event it would be very difficult to know how a requirement to give
notification should be interpreted in respect of the acquisition or use of a bulk
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