of automated processing and scenario tools or predetermined
assessment criteria, individuals not known to the law
enforcement services who may nonetheless present an ‘interest’
or a risk to public security and who are therefore liable to be
subjected subsequently to more thorough individual checks.
...
241. . . . as I have already observed in paragraph 216 of this
Opinion, the actual interest of PNR schemes is specifically to
guarantee the bulk transfer of data that will allow the
competent authorities to identify, with the assistance of
automated processing and scenario tools or predetermined
assessment criteria, individuals hitherto unknown to the law
enforcement services who may nonetheless present an ‘interest’
or a risk to public security and who are therefore liable to be
subjected subsequently to more thorough individual checks.
Those checks must also be capable of being carried out over a
certain period after the passengers in question have travelled.
242. In addition, unlike the persons whose data was subject to
the processing provided for in Directive 2006/24, all those
coming under the agreement envisaged voluntarily take a
means of international transport to or from a third country, a
means of transport which is itself, repeatedly, unfortunately, an
vehicle or a victim of terrorism or serious transnational crime,
which requires the adoption of measures ensuring a high level
of security for all passengers.
243. It is indeed possible to imagine a PNR data transfer and
processing scheme that distinguished passengers according to,
for example, geographic areas of origin (when they stop over in
the Union) or according to passengers’ age, minors, for
example, prima facie representing a lesser risk for public
security. However, in so far as they were considered not to
involve prohibited discrimination, such measures, once they
became known, might well entail the circumvention of the terms
of the agreement envisaged, which would in any event be
prejudicial to the effective attainment of one of its objectives.
244. As already indicated, however, it is not sufficient to
imagine in the abstract alternative measures that would be less
restrictive of individuals’ fundamental rights. To my mind,
those measures must also present guarantees of effectiveness
comparable with those the implementation of which is
envisaged with the aim of combating terrorism and serious
transnational crime. No other measure which, while limiting
the number of persons whose PNR data is automatically
processed by the Canadian competent authority, would be
capable of attaining with comparable effectiveness the public
security aim pursued by the contracting parties has been
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