discretion is to be afforded to Member States in designing the systems which
should apply in a particular context for the collection, retention and accessing
of data, and where to strike the balance.
53.
We turn to deal with each of the Watson Requirements.
(1)
Bulk acquisition and automated processing
54.
It is clear that the Grand Chamber in Watson did not have the material to
address any of the benefits of bulk acquisition in the context of national
security in its Judgment, not least because no evidence in that regard was put
before them, and in any event, as discussed above, the concentration was on
criminal investigation. The evidence is referred to above, and the informed
comments of the ISC and of the Anderson Report, which the Claimant did not
dispute. As set out above, the Grand Chamber in Watson only addressed
targeted access.
There is in the last sentence of paragraph 119 of the
Judgment the only place (other than a brief reference in paragraph 111) where
national security is specifically addressed:
“However, in particular situations, where for example vital
national security, defence or public security interests are
threatened by terrorist activities, access to the data of other
persons might also be granted where there is objective
evidence from which it can be deduced that data might, in a
specific case, make any effective contribution to combating
such activities.”
55.
However:
a. The references to ‘particular situations’ and ‘in a specific case’ do not
fit the circumstances before us, where the evidence, and in particular
the Anderson Report, establishes the necessity of the availability of
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