(d)
14.
Even where alternatives might be available, they are
frequently more intrusive than the use of bulk
acquisition.”
Those findings fully support the evidence given in this case by the
Respondents that the use of bulk communications data is of critical value to
the intelligence agencies, and is of particular value in identifying potential
threats by persons who are not the target of any investigation. These datasets
need to be as comprehensive as possible if they are to be effective. The use of
these datasets is very different from, for example, their use in an investigation
of a criminal offence by police, in which case the police may well have an
identified suspect who can be made the subject of a targeted investigation.
The Respondents’ witnesses speak persuasively of developing fragmentary
intelligence, of enriching ‘seed’ information, of following patterns and
anomalies, and of the need for the haystack in order to find the needle.
15.
The MI5 witness concluded his statement as follows:
“152)
In my capacity as Deputy Director for Data Access
and Policy I saw how vital BCD is for the work of MI5,
in particular in relation to counter-terrorism work. I
am able to say, based on what I have seen myself and
been told by colleagues in MI5, that the use of BCD by
MI5 has stopped terrorist attacks and has saved lives
many times.
153)
The acquisition of BCD enables MI5 to identify threats
and investigate in ways that, without this capability,
would be either impossible or considerably slower. In
many case[s] communications data may be the only
investigative lead that we have to work from. Further,
without BCD, it would be necessary to carry out other
and more intrusive enquiries; for example many more
individual requests for CD or use other more intrusive
powers in order to narrow the scope of a search. The
inability to use BCD would therefore involve greater
intrusion into the privacy of individuals.
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