8
WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
(4) the illegal importation of drugs in substantial quantities into the
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany;
(5) the counterfeiting of money (Geldfälschung) committed abroad;
(6) the laundering of money in the context of the acts listed under
points 3 to 5.
Pursuant to section 3(1), third sentence, restrictions on the secrecy of
telecommunications could also be ordered for telecommunications via fixed
telephone lines and for mail in order to identify and avert the dangers listed
in section 3(1), second sentence, point 1.
28. The Federal Constitutional Court found that, pursuant to Article 73,
point 1, of the Basic Law (see paragraph 15 above), the federal legislature
had exclusive legislative power to regulate the matters listed in section 3(1)
of the amended G 10 Act, as they concerned foreign affairs.
29. However, the Federal Constitutional Court took the view that
allowing the monitoring of telecommunications in order to prevent the
counterfeiting of money abroad, in accordance with point 5 of section 3(1)
in its present wording, constituted a disproportionate interference with the
secrecy of telecommunications as protected by Article 10 of the Basic Law.
It argued that this danger as such could not be considered to be as serious as
an armed attack on the German State or any of the other dangers listed in
section 3(1). The counterfeiting of money should therefore be included in
section 3(1) only if it was restricted to cases in which it threatened the
monetary stability of the Federal Republic of Germany. The court ruled that,
pending the entry into force of legislation in compliance with the
Constitution, section 3(1), second sentence, point 5, was to be applied only
if the counterfeiting of money abroad threatened monetary stability in
Germany.
30. In practice, wireless telecommunications (as opposed to
telecommunications via fixed telephone lines) comprised some ten per cent
of the total volume of telecommunications at the relevant time. However,
given technical progress, the volume of such telecommunications was
expected to rise in the future.
31. Technically, telecommunications via satellite links (with the
satellites being positioned some 36,000 km above the equator) could be
intercepted from sites in Germany if the signal reflected by the satellite (the
“downlink”) covered the area in which the station was located. The area
covered by the satellite beam depended on the satellite technology used.
Whereas signals downlinked by older satellites often “beamed” across
one-third of the earth’s surface, more modern satellites could concentrate
their downlink on smaller areas. Signals could be intercepted everywhere
within the area covered by the beam. International radio relay links
(Richtfunkstrecken) could be intercepted from interception sites on German
soil only if the radio relay transmission was effected within close proximity
of these sites.