WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
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be specific facts arousing a suspicion that someone had committed one of
the offences listed in section 3(3) and that the transmission had to be
recorded in minutes. It stressed that such safeguards could also ensure that
the Federal Intelligence Service took into account the important concerns of
non-disclosure of sources and confidentiality of editorial work protected by
the freedom of the press enshrined in Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law.
151. The Court observes that in the instant case, strategic monitoring
was carried out in order to prevent the offences listed in section 3(1). It was
therefore not aimed at monitoring journalists; generally the authorities
would know only when examining the intercepted telecommunications, if at
all, that a journalist’s conversation had been monitored. Surveillance
measures were, in particular, not directed at uncovering journalistic sources.
The interference with freedom of expression by means of strategic
monitoring cannot, therefore, be characterised as particularly serious.
152. It is true that the impugned provisions of the amended G 10 Act did
not contain special rules safeguarding the protection of freedom of the press
and, in particular, the non-disclosure of sources, once the authorities had
become aware that they had intercepted a journalist’s conversation.
However, the Court, having regard to its findings under Article 8, observes
that the impugned provisions contained numerous safeguards to keep the
interference with the secrecy of telecommunications – and therefore with
the freedom of the press – within the limits of what was necessary to
achieve the legitimate aims pursued. In particular, the safeguards which
ensured that data obtained were used only to prevent certain serious
criminal offences must also be considered adequate and effective for
keeping the disclosure of journalistic sources to an unavoidable minimum.
In these circumstances the Court concludes that the respondent State
adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to justify interference with freedom
of expression as a result of the impugned provisions by reference to the
legitimate interests of national security and the prevention of crime. Having
regard to its margin of appreciation, the respondent State was entitled to
consider these requirements to override the right to freedom of expression.
153. The Court concludes that the first applicant’s complaints under
Article 10 of the Convention must be dismissed as being manifestly illfounded, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
D. Complaints under Article 13 of the Convention
154. In the applicants’ view, certain provisions of the Fight Against
Crime Act amending the G 10 Act, as interpreted and modified by the
Federal Constitutional Court, violated their right to an effective remedy.
They complained, in particular, about the destruction of personal data
(section 3(6) and (7) taken in conjunction with section 7(4) of the G 10
Act), the failure to receive notice of restrictions on the secrecy of