34
WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
for journalistic purposes might be monitored and that her journalistic
sources might be either disclosed or deterred from calling or providing
information by telephone. For similar reasons to those set out in respect of
Article 8, the transmission of data to other authorities, their destruction and
the failure to notify the first applicant of surveillance measures could serve
further to impair the confidentiality and protection of information given to
her by her sources.
146. The Court therefore accepts that the impugned provisions interfered
with the first applicant’s freedom of expression.
(b) Whether the interference was justified
147. The Court, for the reasons set out in connection with Article 8,
finds that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of
expression was prescribed by law, since it resulted from the impugned
provisions of the amended G 10 Act, an Act passed by Parliament and
applicable in the manner set out by the Federal Constitutional Court in its
judgment of 14 July 1999.
148. The Court also finds that the interference pursued a legitimate aim,
namely, the protection of the interests of national security and/or the
prevention of crime.
149. In examining whether the interference was “necessary in a
democratic society”, the Court reiterates that, having regard to the
importance of the protection of journalistic sources for the freedom of the
press in a democratic society, an interference cannot be compatible with
Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding
requirement in the public interest. In reviewing the decisions taken – or
provisions enacted – by national authorities exercising their power of
appreciation, the Court must look at the “interference” complained of in the
light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by the national
authorities to justify it were “relevant and sufficient” (see, inter alia,
Goodwin, cited above, §§ 39-40, and Roemen and Schmit, cited above,
§ 46).
150. The Court notes at the outset that the Federal Constitutional Court
found that the two impugned provisions concerning transmission to other
authorities of data obtained by means of strategic monitoring, namely
section 3(3) and (5), infringed the freedom of the press as protected by
Article 5 § 1, second sentence, of the Basic Law. In order to ensure that data
were used only for the purpose which had justified their collection, it
ordered, in particular, that section 3(3) could be applied only if the personal
data transmitted to the Federal Government were marked and remained
connected to the purposes which had justified their collection. As regards
the transmission of data to the authorities listed in section 3(5), the court
laid down stricter conditions for transmission by ordering that there had to