WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
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interference had been justified within the meaning of paragraph 2 of that
Article. It had been prescribed by law and was necessary in a democratic
society. The Government referred to their submissions regarding Article 8
in that connection.
(b) The first applicant
142. The first applicant submitted, in particular, that the impugned
monitoring powers under section 3(1) of the amended G 10 Act prejudiced
the work of journalists investigating issues targeted by surveillance
measures. She could no longer guarantee that information she received in
the course of her journalistic activities remained confidential. Section 3(1)
of the amended G 10 Act did not sufficiently protect journalists’
communications and therefore disregarded the importance of a free press in
a democratic society.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Whether there was an interference
143. The Court reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes one of
the essential foundations of a democratic society and that the safeguards to
be afforded to the press are of particular importance. The protection of
journalistic sources is one of the cornerstones of freedom of the press.
Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in
informing the public about matters of public interest. As a result the vital
public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined, and the ability of the
press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected
(see, inter alia, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, § 39,
Reports 1996-II, and Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99,
§ 46, ECHR 2003-IV).
144. The Court further refers to its above findings under Article 8 to the
effect that legislation permitting a system for effecting secret surveillance of
communications involves a threat of surveillance in respect of persons such
as the first applicant, who sufficiently substantiated her argument that that
legislation could be applied to her. This threat necessarily strikes at the
freedom of communication between users of telecommunications services
and therefore amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise of the
applicant’s rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually
taken against her.
145. In the Court’s view, this finding must be applied, mutatis mutandis,
to the first applicant’s right, in her capacity as a journalist, to freedom of
expression as guaranteed by Article 10 § 1. The applicant communicated
with persons she wished to interview on subjects such as drugs and arms
trafficking or preparations for war, which were also the focus of strategic
monitoring. Consequently, there was a danger that her telecommunications