28
WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
Federal Intelligence Service by means of the interception of
telecommunications. The criminal prosecution of individuals was the task of
the judiciary alone, and the transmission of such personal data could be
abused for political aims.
121. The Court notes at the outset that in its judgment the Federal
Constitutional Court found that the impugned provisions did not contain
sufficient safeguards to ensure that the duty of the Federal Intelligence
Service to report to the Federal Government, which included the
transmission of personal data, was performed only for the purposes which
had justified the collection of the data. That court ruled that, pending the
entry into force of legislation in compliance with the Constitution,
section 3(3), second sentence, could only be applied if the personal data
contained in the report to the Federal Government were marked and
remained connected to the purposes which had justified their collection.
122. The Court finds that the impugned provision, as amended and
applicable following the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court, laid
down strict conditions with regard to the transmission to the Federal
Government of data obtained by means of strategic monitoring. It is further
convinced by the Government’s argument that, in order to avert effectively
the dangers listed in section 3(1), the transmission of personal – as opposed
to anonymous – data might prove necessary. The additional safeguards
introduced by the Federal Constitutional Court are appropriate for the
purpose of limiting the use of the information obtained to what is necessary
to serve the purpose of strategic monitoring.
(iii) Transmission of personal data to the Offices for the Protection of the
Constitution and other authorities and their use by these authorities in
accordance with section 3(5) of the G 10 Act
123. In the Government’s view, the transmission of the data in question
was necessary in a democratic society for the prevention and prosecution of
crime. It was a suitable means of achieving this aim, as it was the task of the
recipient authorities to avert and investigate criminal offences. Taking into
account the stipulations of the Federal Constitutional Court (in particular to
the effect that transmission of data was permitted only if specific facts – as
opposed to mere factual indications – had aroused the suspicion that one of
the offences listed in section 3(3) was being planned or had been
committed), the powers to transmit data were also not unreasonably wide.
Moreover, there were sufficient procedural safeguards to guarantee that
these requirements were complied with. The decision to transmit data was
taken by a staff member qualified to hold judicial office and was reviewed
by the G 10 Commission.
124. The applicants submitted that the transmission of personal data to,
among other authorities, the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution
was a further interference with their rights, which was not necessary in a