WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION
27
examination of personal data obtained by the Federal Intelligence Service,
the Federal Constitutional Court strengthened the existing safeguards by
ordering that such data had to be marked as stemming from strategic
monitoring and were not to be used for ends other than those listed in
section 3(1). The transmission of data to the Federal Government and to
other authorities under section 3(3) and (5) was also subject to conditions
(which will be examined in more detail below). Moreover, the G 10 Act
contained strict provisions concerning the storage and destruction of data.
The responsibility for reviewing stored files on a six-monthly basis was
entrusted to an official qualified to hold judicial office. Data had to be
destroyed as soon as they were no longer needed to achieve the purpose
pursued (see paragraphs 130-32 below).
117. As regards supervision and review of monitoring measures, the
Court notes that the G 10 Act provided for independent supervision by two
bodies which had a comparatively significant role to play. Firstly, there was
a Parliamentary Supervisory Board, which consisted of nine members of
parliament, including members of the opposition. The Federal Minister
authorising monitoring measures had to report to this board at least every
six months. Secondly, the Act established the G 10 Commission, which had
to authorise surveillance measures and had substantial power in relation to
all stages of interception. The Court observes that in its judgment in Klass
and Others (cited above, §§ 53-60) it found this system of supervision,
which remained essentially the same under the amended G 10 Act in issue
here, to be such as to keep the interference resulting from the contested
legislation to what was “necessary in a democratic society”. It sees no
reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
118. Consequently, strategic monitoring under section 3(1) was
embedded into a legislative context providing considerable safeguards
against abuse.
(ii) Transmission and use of personal data pursuant to section 3(3), second
sentence, of the G 10 Act taken in conjunction with section 12 of the Federal
Intelligence Service Act
119. The Government submitted that in a democratic society it was
necessary for the Federal Intelligence Service to report to the Federal
Government on the results of its monitoring measures in accordance with
section 3(3), second sentence, of the amended G 10 Act taken in
conjunction with section 12 of the Federal Intelligence Service Act. This
included the transmission of personal data which had to be marked as
deriving from such measures. Otherwise, the government would not be in a
position to take effective measures to avert the dangers listed in
section 3(1).
120. The applicants argued that there was no reason for the Federal
Government to receive non-anonymous personal data obtained by the