2. In our estimation, our complaint raises an issue of profound constitutional significance
which the Constitutional Court has not addressed on the merits to date. The cause of
constitutionalism and the constitutional compliance of the objective legal system, this latter
being a precondition for the enforcement of the fundamental rights in the case at hand,
demand that the Constitutional Court take a position on the question of whether, in the
absence of a safeguard by means of judicial intervention or review, it is constitutionally
admissible to allow the restriction — in effect, suspension — of the right to privacy by the
contested provisions. This question cannot be answered simply by mutual reference to the
abstract declaration of the right to privacy in the Fundamental Law and, respectively, to the
fundamental rules of restricting privacy [Fundamental Law, Article I (3)], without any
further interpretation. Therefore, our petition satisfies the criteria of admissibility spelled
out in Section 29 of the Constitutional Court Act.
3. The provisions contested herein were set forth and inserted in the language of the Police
Act by Section 8 of Act CCVII of 2011 on the Amendment of Certain Acts on Law
Enforcement and on Other Related Amendments. Considering that these provisions entered
into force on January 5, 2012, fewer than 180 days had elapsed by the time we submitted
this petition. Consequently, the deadline for filing a constitutional complaint as stipulated
under Section 30 (4) of the Constitutional Court Act has been met and therefore cannot
form an obstacle to conducting the process.
The provisions of the National Security Act that we also claim to be unconstitutional
entered into force more than 180 days ago, so we are barred by law from petitioning the
abolition of these provisions. However, the fact that the scope of our petition cannot and
does not cover the National Security Act should not be construed to mean that the
provisions we do contest herein, which have recourse to very similar principles, would be
constitutional.
4. Given that the Constitutional Court has not ruled on the compatibility of the provisions
in question with the Fundamental Law to date, the prohibition under Section 30 of the
Constitutional Court Act does not apply, so it cannot disqualify our petition either.
5. Mandatory legal representation in accordance with Section 51 of the Constitutional
Court Act is provided by attorney at law Dr. László Majtényi of the Law Firm of Dr.
László Majtényi, whose power of attorney is enclosed herewith.
II.
In what follows, we will demonstrate the unconstitutional nature of the contested
provisions.
The provisions we object to violate our fundamental rights on account of enabling two
organizations to collect covert intelligence on us without a court warrant, merely requiring
authorization by a minister as a condition to proceed.