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SZABÓ AND VISSY v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1986 respectively and live in
Budapest.
7. When introducing the application, the applicants were staff members
of Eötvös Károly Közpolitikai Intézet, a non-governmental, “watchdog”
organisation voicing criticism of the Government. The subsequent employer
of one of the applicants was subjected to financial control measures by the
Government in 2014, which according to the applicants verged on vexation.
8. Act no. CXLVII of 2010 defines combating terrorism as one of the
tasks of the police. Within the force, a specific Anti-Terrorism Task Force
(“TEK”) was established as of 1 January 2011. Its competence is defined in
section 7/E of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, as amended by Act
no. CCVII of 2011 (the “Police Act”).
9. Under this legislation, TEK’s prerogatives in the field of secret
intelligence gathering include secret house search and surveillance with
recording, opening of letters and parcels, as well as checking and recording
the contents of electronic or computerised communications, all this without
the consent of the persons concerned.
10. The authorisation process for these activities is dependent on the
actual competence exercised by TEK, namely whether it is within the
framework of secret surveillance linked to the investigation of certain
specific crimes enumerated in the law (section 7/E (2)) or to secret
surveillance within the framework of intelligence gathering for national
security (section 7/E (3)).
11. Whereas the scenario under section 7/E (2) is as such subject to
judicial authorisation, the one under section 7/E (3) is authorised by the
Minister in charge of justice, (i) in order to prevent terrorist acts or in the
interests of Hungary’s national security or (ii) in order to rescue Hungarian
citizens from capture abroad in war zones or in the context of terrorist acts.
12. “Section 7/E (3) surveillance” takes place under the rules of the
National Security Act under the condition that the necessary intelligence
cannot be obtained in any other way. Otherwise, the law does not contain
any particular rules on the circumstances in which this measure can be
ordered, as opposed to “section 7/E (2) surveillance”, which is conditional
on the suspicion of certain serious crimes. The time-frame of
“section 7/E (3) surveillance” is 90 days, which can be prolonged for
another 90-day period by the Minister; however, the latter has no right to
know about the results of the ongoing surveillance when called on to decide
on its prolongation. Once the surveillance is terminated, the law imposes no
specific obligation on the authorities to destroy any irrelevant intelligence
obtained.