opinion within three months of receiving the objection, the administrative oversight
body may refer the objection to the quasi-judicial oversight body for a final decision.
(4) The quasi-judicial oversight body takes a decision on the objection after consulting
the Federal Chancellery. If the quasi-judicial oversight body concludes that the objection
is legitimate, it issues an order stating that the objection must be remedied immediately
or by a deadline which it has set.
Section 53
Employees of the Independent Oversight Council
The employees of the Independent Oversight Council must be German nationals and
must undergo an enhanced security clearance with security checks in accordance with
the Security Clearances Act.
Section 54
Confidentiality; permission to give evidence
(1) The deliberations of the Independent Oversight Council are confidential.
(2) The members of the quasi-judicial oversight body and all employees of the
Independent Oversight Council are obliged to maintain confidentiality in respect of
matters disclosed to them during or in connection with their activities within the
Independent Oversight Council. This obligation will continue to apply even after
they have left the Independent Oversight Council.
(3) The President of the Independent Oversight Council decides whether permission to
give evidence should be granted. Said permission must be refused if it would be
detrimental to the interests of the Federal Government or a Land or if it would
seriously jeopardise or significantly impede the performance of public tasks. The
Vice-President decides whether permission to give evidence should be granted to the
President.
Section 55
Reporting by the Independent Oversight Council
(1) The Independent Oversight Council reports on its work to the Parliamentary
Oversight Panel at intervals of no more than six months.
(2) The reports pursuant to paragraph 1 are made after consulting the Federal
Chancellery, with due regard for confidentiality, and are restricted to the information
and topics covered by the discretionary powers of the Federal Intelligence Service. In
other cases, the Federal Chancellery must inform the Independent Oversight Council. At
the request of the Independent Oversight Council, the Federal Chancellery must take
appropriate measures to ensure that reports on the above-mentioned information and
topics can be submitted to the Parliamentary Oversight Panel. If necessary in keeping
with the interests of the Federal Government or a Land, and in particular on compelling
grounds relating to access to intelligence or the protection of third-party rights to