(1)
The Independent Oversight Council shall be a supreme federal authority and, as an
independent body for oversight of the technical surveillance of the Federal Intelligence
Service, shall be subject only to the law.
(2)
The Independent Oversight Council shall be chaired by a President. The President
shall represent the authority externally. He or she shall direct the administration of the
Independent Oversight Council and exercise administrative supervision.
(3)
The Independent Oversight Council shall be independent and not bound by
instructions in the exercise of it powers.
(4)
The Independent Oversight Council shall be subject to examination of its budgetary
and economic management by the Federal Audit Office, provided that its independence is not
thereby adversely affected.
(5)
The Independent Oversight Council shall, after consulting the Federal Chancellery,
establish for itself:
1.
internal regulations; and
2.
rules of procedure.
Account shall be taken of the secrecy protection interests of the Federal Intelligence Service.
The members of the quasi-judicial control body shall decide upon the internal regulations and
rules of procedure by a majority of votes. If voting is tied, the President shall have the casting
vote. The Independent Oversight Council shall inform the Parliamentary Oversight Body of
its internal regulations.
(6)
The offices of the Independent Oversight Council shall be located in Berlin and
Pullach.
§ 42
Competence of the quasi-judicial oversight body
(1)
The quasi-judicial oversight body shall be competent in the context of strategic
foreign telecommunications surveillance for prior oversight of the legality of:
1.
the ordering of strategic surveillance measures under § 23(1) (§ 23(4));
2.
the ordering of objectives under § 23(5) (§ 23(7));
3.
the establishment of a qualified need for surveillance in the processing of unselected
traffic data in the course of cooperation of the Federal Intelligence Service with foreign
intelligence services under § 33(2); and
4.
the usability or erasure of data under § 22(3) in the event of doubt; and
5.
the transfer of data under § 29(8) and § 30(9).
(2)
The quasi-judicial oversight body shall further be competent in the context of strategic
foreign telecommunications surveillance to monitor the legality of: