CM 7324) and the statement made by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons
on 6 February 2008 accepting the committee’s main conclusion that it should be
possible to find a way to use some intercept material as evidence provided – and
only provided – that certain key conditions can be met. The report sets out nine
conditions in detail. They relate to complex and important issues, and include:
giving the intercepting agencies the ability to retain control over whether their
material is used in prosecutions; ensuring that disclosure of material cannot be
required against the wishes of the agency originating the material; protecting the
current close co-operation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies;
and ensuring that agencies cannot be required to transcribe or make notes of
material beyond a standard of detail that they deem necessary.
2.7 The committee acknowledged that further extensive work is needed to
see whether and how these issues and other conditions – intended to protect
sensitive techniques, safeguard resources, and ensure that intercept can still be
used effectively for intelligence – can be met. This is a recommendation that the
government has accepted. I understand that a detailed implementation plan will
be developed under which material might be made available for use in criminal
cases in England and Wales, strictly subject to all the Chilcot conditions being
met. I welcome the government’s acceptance that if the Chilcot conditions could
not be met then intercept as evidence should not be introduced. I will watch the
development of the implementation plan with interest.
International Symposium: Accountability of Intelligence and Security Agencies
and Human Rights
2.8 On 7 and 8 June 2007 I attended an International Symposium in The Hague, The
Netherlands. The theme of the Symposium was “the accountability of the intelligence
and security agencies and human rights”. Members of the Intelligence and Security
Committee were also present. There were delegates from a number of countries
from around the world – including Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany,
The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom and the
United States of America. With the intelligence and security services assuming an
ever more important role – they have the power to infringe universally acknowledged
human rights, subject to strict conditions – the Symposium discussed what these
conditions were and how oversight in this context is organised from the perspective
of human rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). A number of sessions looked at themes related to the Symposium topic
from the perspectives of (i) oversight bodies, (ii) the academic community, (iii) the
judiciary, (iv) the media and (v) the intelligence and security services themselves. I
found the discussions during the Symposium and in the course of informal meetings
to be interesting, informative and valuable.
Successes
2.9 I continue to be impressed as to how interception has contributed to a number
of striking successes during 2007. It has played a key role in numerous operations
including, for example, the prevention of murders, tackling large-scale drug
importations, evasion of Excise duty, people smuggling, gathering intelligence
both within the United Kingdom and overseas on terrorist and various extremist
organisations, confiscation of firearms, serious violent crime and terrorism. I have
provided fully detailed examples in the Confidential Annex to this Report. I think
it is very important that the public is re-assured as to the benefits of this highly
intrusive investigative tool particularly in light of the on-going debate about
whether or not intercept product should be used as evidence in a court of law.
Errors
2.10 Twenty-four interception errors and breaches have been reported to me
during the course of 2007. This is the same number of errors reported in my first
Annual Report (which was for a shorter period) and is a significant decrease in
the number reported by my predecessor. I consider the number of errors to be
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