ity in foreign and security policy and a transfer to other bodies is ruled out, qualified
protection of legal interests or thresholds for data sharing are not required under constitutional law.
a) Such further requirements are not needed here given that providing information
to the Federal Government on matters that are significant to foreign and security policy is the primary purpose of foreign surveillance and the provision of such information constitutes an exceptionally significant public interest even if there are no indications that a specific danger may emerge.
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Most notably, where surveillance is only used to provide political intelligence to the
Federal Government, its weight of interference vis-à-vis the person under surveillance is generally significantly lower. Insofar as such intelligence does not concern
government officials of other states, in respect of which surveillance can in principle
be justified by public interest, personal data will often be irrelevant to such reports
provided to the Federal Government so that it can, or even must, be deleted. But
even where it is necessary to include personal data in such reports, these reports
differ fundamentally from the sharing of intelligence concerning individuals with domestic authorites that – directly or indirectly – have executive powers and may use
these powers against those individuals. This is all the more true when comparing
such reports to the sharing of intelligence with foreign bodies. When intelligence is
used as background information for the Federal Government or as a basis for preparing governmental decision-making, the interest in the individuals concerned typically
becomes less important; therefore, sharing can be justified regardless of whether
specific thresholds for data sharing are observed.
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However, such reports to the Federal Government solely serve to provide political
intelligence at the governmental level. Insofar as this intelligence is provided irrespective of the adherence to thresholds for data sharing, its use is therefore limited to decisions made by the Federal Government itself in foreign and security policy. The
Federal Government can use this intelligence to perform its duties – including communicating with foreign governments and international organisations – as long as it
does not share it with domestic or foreign subordinate agencies for other, in particular
operational, purposes. The same applies to the Federal Government’s interaction
with Land governments.
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b) Insofar as intelligence stems from surveillance measures carried out for the purpose of early detection of dangers and thus serves both the provision of intelligence
to the Federal Government and the early detection of dangers – which appears to be
common practice –, such intelligence may be used for purposes other than government activities. However, where such intelligence is intended to be shared with bodies other than the Federal Government or Land governments that carry out operational work – in particular security authorities or domestic administrative authorities –
statutory authorisations for sharing the data are required, as is the case for the direct
sharing of data with other bodies. These authorisations must satisfy the above-men-
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