mation obtained by the intelligence services with authorities that carry out operational
measures (cf. BVerfGE 133, 277 <329 para. 123>).
4. In light of the foregoing, requirements must be set both regarding the protection
of legal interests and regarding thresholds for the use of powers, in this case thresholds for data sharing. These must distinguish between data sharing for public security
purposes and for law enforcement purposes (cf. BVerfGE 100, 313 <394>; 141, 220
<270 and 271 paras. 107 and 108>).
220
In terms of the protection of legal interests, data sharing for public security purposes
is only permissible to protect particularly weighty legal interests (cf. BVerfGE 125,
260 <329 and 330>; 133, 277 <365 para. 203>; 141, 220 <270 para. 108>). Insofar
as the law provides for a change in purpose, data sharing does not have to serve the
protection of the same legal interest as the warrant authorising surveillance by the
intelligence service. In principle, such sharing must be directly based on a legal interest, rather than on statutory catalogues of criminal offences; in any case, a reference
to criminal offences must not include the criminalisation of preparatory acts or mere
threats to legal interests, which would shift the threshold at which acts become punishable to a time before a danger actually arises (cf. BVerfGE 125, 260 <329 and
330>). By contrast, data sharing for law enforcement purposes must be limited to
criminal offences of great weight. Based on these criteria, such sharing is only justified if it serves to prosecute particularly serious criminal offences. These particularly
serious criminal offences must generally be determined in statutory catalogues.
221
In terms of thresholds for data sharing, sufficiently specific indications of a possible
danger are required to justify data sharing for public security purposes. The legislator
does not have to make data sharing contingent upon the existence of a specific
(konkrete Gefahr), immediate (unmittelbar bevorstehende Gefahr) or present danger
(gegenwärtige Gefahr) as is traditionally required for public security measures. However, the statutory basis must require sufficient indications of a specific danger in the
sense that there be at least factual indications that a specific danger to the protected
legal interests may emerge (cf. in this respect BVerfGE 141, 220 <271 et seq.
para. 111 et seq.>). Insofar as data is shared for law enforcement purposes, there
must be sufficiently specific facts that give rise to the suspicion that a particularly serious criminal act has been committed. Mere indications that are sufficient to launch
initial, general investigations (cf. § 152(2) StPO) do not suffice here; rather, specific
facts are required that give rise to the suspicion that such criminal acts have been
committed (cf. BVerfGE 125, 260 <328 and 329>), which corresponds to the requirements for the surveillance of private homes pursuant to § 100c StPO. In this respect,
there must be circumstances that have taken specific shape to some extent and support such a suspicion ([…]).
222
5. This does not apply to the sharing of intelligence stemming from strategic surveillance with the Federal Government solely in its governmental capacity. Where information is provided to the Federal Government so that it can discharge its responsibil-
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