If the Federal Intelligence Service wants to use search terms determined by a cooperating intelligence service to automatically share any
matches with this service without any detailed content-related analysis, these search terms and the resulting matches must be checked
thoroughly. The obligations to obtain assurances that are applicable
to the sharing of data with other countries apply accordingly. The
sharing of traffic data in its entirety with cooperating intelligence services requires a qualified need for intelligence relating to specific indications that a specific danger may emerge. The Federal Intelligence
Service must obtain substantial assurances from the cooperating services regarding their handling of the shared data.
8. The powers to conduct strategic surveillance measures, to share the
intelligence thus obtained and to cooperate with foreign intelligence
services are only compatible with the proportionality requirements if
they are complemented by independent oversight. Such oversight
must be designed as continual legal oversight that allows for comprehensive access to scrutinise the surveillance process.
On the one hand, it must be ensured that the key procedural steps of
strategic surveillance are subject to independent oversight resembling
judicial review that has the power to make final decisions. On the other hand, the measures must be subject to administrative oversight that
conducts randomised oversight of the legality of the entire surveillance process on its own initiative.
Institutional independence of the oversight bodies must be guaranteed. This includes a separate budget, independent personnel management, and procedural autonomy for the oversight bodies. They
must be equipped with the personnel and resources required for the
effective performance of their tasks. They must have all powers necessary for conducting effective oversight vis-à-vis the Federal Intelligence Service. It must also be ensured that oversight is not obstructed by the third party rule.
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