2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
in place to prevent recurrence. I am pleased to say that this CSP has since put in place some very
sensible measures which will hopefully prevent recurrence of similar errors in future. Fortunately
errors with such severe consequences are rare.
Figure 7 shows that 24% of the errors were caused by either the applicant, SPoC or CSP
acquiring data on the correct communications address but for the incorrect date / time period.
An additional 13% of the errors were caused by the SPoC acquiring the incorrect type of data
(i.e. outgoing call data instead of subscriber data) on the correct communications address.
The vast majority of the errors I have described in the preceding paragraphs could be eradicated
by removing the double keying in the systems and processes. However in 26% of cases the
process started with the applicant actually requesting the incorrect details and this demonstrates
the need to emphasise the importance of double checking to applicants.
I will provide further information in relation to some of these errors later in this report. However
it is worth mentioning now that 99 of the 895 errors were identified by my inspectors during the
inspections. This confirms that the inspections are worthwhile and provides evidence that the
public authorities’ records are properly scrutinised by my inspectors. In the main these errors
had not been reported by the public authorities in question as they had genuinely not realised
they had occurred. In a very small number of cases the lack of reporting was an oversight.
Under the Code of Practice I have the power to direct a public authority to provide information
to an individual who has been adversely affected by any wilful or reckless exercise of or failure
to exercise its powers under the Act. So far it has not been necessary for me to use this power
but there is no room for complacency, and each public authority understands that it must strive
to achieve the highest possible standards.
7.5. Inspection Results
As already indicated a team of inspectors, lead by a Chief Inspector, inspect on my behalf those
public authorities with the requisite powers under RIPA to acquire communications data. Due
to the larger number of public authorities with powers to acquire communications data, the
presentation of the results of communications data inspections differs from the presentation of the
results of the inspections I conduct in relation to lawful interception. The bodies being inspected
fall into 4 groups: police forces and law enforcement agencies (LEAs), intelligence agencies, local
authorities, and ‘other’ public authorities. I now set out the key findings of the inspections in
relation to these groups, along with some further case studies where communications data has
been used effectively in investigations.
7.5.1. Police Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies
There are 43 police forces in England & Wales; 8 police forces in Scotland; and the Police Service
of Northern Ireland which are all subject to inspection. Additionally my inspectors inspect the
British Transport Police; Port of Liverpool Police; Port of Dover Police; Royal Military Police; Royal
Air Force Police; Ministry of Defence Police; Royal Navy Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.
Law enforcement agencies comprise Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC); the Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA);
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