2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
Case Study 11 - An Example of an Intercept Error by a CSP
September 2011 - A CSP reported an error as a result of which interception was targeted
at an uninvolved third-party. The usual processes in place to prevent incorrect targeting
had been ineffective in noticing or preventing the initial operator error. The cause of the
error was human oversight. An operator incorrectly recorded a communications address
at the feasibility stage and then failed to check back with relevant systems to ensure
that the correct tasking was being undertaken. The error was discovered some days
later as part of a routine call back to the requesting agency. The disparity between the
paperwork and intercept systems was noted. The error was immediately rectified. Any
product collected was destroyed. A number of steps were taken to reduce the likelihood
of recurrence.The CSP has now implemented a system involving a second person checking
each new tasking to ensure accuracy. Daily checks have also been expanded to ensure that
tasking registers and intercept systems match up.
6.5.6. Home Office
Security Service and law enforcement interception warrants must pass through the National
Security Unit at the Home Office prior to reaching the Home Secretary. I have undertaken
inspection visits to the Home Office as an extra check on authorisations. I undertook formal
visits to the Home Office in June and December. Lists of interception warrants (current, extant
and expired) were provided to my office in good time to select sample warrants for these review
visits. The visits took place in the Home Office, London.
Meeting with Home Secretary
I met with the Home Secretary in early 2012. We discussed in broad terms, whether she felt she
was being supplied with sufficient information when signing interception warrants for national
security and serious crime, my views on the agencies’ compliance with RIPA, some specific errors
I was concerned with, the structure of my forthcoming Annual Report, non-statutory compliance
and other relevant policy matters. These matters are discussed in more detail in the confidential
supplement that accompanies this report and will be distributed to senior intelligence officials
across Whitehall.
I am satisfied that the Home Secretary takes care before signing interception warrants that
potentially infringe on the private lives of citizens. It was apparent that she took time to read
submissions throughout the day, often requesting further information and updates from officials
in relation to certain warrants. The Secretary of State does not ‘rubber-stamp’ authorisations.
6.5.7. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
I also undertake inspection visits to the FCO. The purpose of these visits is to meet with those
senior officials at the Department of State (Head of Intelligence Policy Department, Director
of National Security and Director-General Defence and Intelligence) who advise the Secretary
of State on matters related to his signing of GCHQ and SIS authorisations. I also undertake an
additional scrutiny of SIS and GCHQ warrantry submissions.
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