2011 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner
Case Study 5 –Example of an Intercept Error by the SyS
March 2011 – Following a fault in the CSP’s interception system, the service worked with
the CSP to mitigate the consequential loss of intelligence collection and threat to national
security as a result. Due to a breakdown in internal communications the solution for the
interception of an internet connection did not take into account undertakings made in
the corresponding warrant application regarding how the intercepted material would be
handled; intercepted material was no longer subjected by the Security Service to handling
arrangements that were required by the warrant and had been previously applied. A number
of new measures and procedures were established to minimise the risk of the error being
repeated. The error was reported to the Commissioner who was content with the detailed
report and measures outline to minimise the risk of any repetition.
Case Study 6 – Example of an Intercept Error by the SyS
September 2011 - An error occurred in relation to the transcription of communications
which did not adhere to the undertakings set out in a warrant. A warrant authorising
interception of a target communications line was signed. The warrant specified that only
certain types of call would be transcribed and retained. Human error resulted in some
communications outside of the parameters set out in the warrant being transcribed. As
a follow up action staff were reminded of the importance of fully understanding their
transcription briefs prior to commencing work on target lines.
6.5.3. Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)
The chronology of my scrutiny visits to SIS over 2011 was as follows:
Selection Days:
May and November 2011
Inspection Days:
late May and early December 2011
All inspections were held at SIS HQ,Vauxhall Cross, London.
I believe that scrutiny of those interception warrants selected, combined with the level of
discussion I was able to have with a cross-section of staff on the subject of legalities during my
Inspection and wider briefing visits is sufficient for me to conclude that compliance at SIS was
robust. I was again impressed by the attitude of all those that I have spoken who work for SIS.
I discussed the following during my inspection visits:
• Threat briefing
�� RIPA interception warrants
Once again, I was satisfied that officers working for the SIS conduct themselves in accordance
with high levels of ethical and legal compliance.
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