1.6 Part III (sections 49 to 56, together with Schedule 2) of RIPA – investigation
of electronic data protected by encryption etc – contains provisions designed
to maintain the effectiveness of existing law enforcement powers in the face
of increasing criminal and hostile intelligence use of encryption (the means of
scrambling electronic information into a secret code of letters, numbers and
signals). Encrypted information cannot be unscrambled without a decoding
key. Part III introduces a power to require disclosure of protected (encrypted)
data. Parliament has now approved the Code of Practice for the investigation
of protected electronic information; it came into force on 1 October 2007 and
provides guidance for the authorities to follow when they require disclosure of
protected electronic information.
Section 2: Part I Chapter I – Interception of
Communications
General
Oversight arrangements
2.1 I have decided to continue with the practice followed by my predecessors
of making twice yearly visits to the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence
Service, Government Communications Headquarters, the Serious Organised
Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, Strathclyde
Police, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office, HM
Revenue and Customs, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office,
the Scottish Government and the Ministry of Defence. In short, I meet officers
in the agencies undertaking interception work and officials in the departments of
the Secretaries of State/Ministers which issue the warrants. Prior to each visit, I
obtain a complete list of warrants issued or renewed or cancelled since my previous
visit. I then select, largely at random, a sample of warrants for inspection. These
include both warrants and attendant certificates. In the course of my visit I satisfy
myself that those warrants fully meet the criteria of RIPA, that proper procedures
have been followed and that the relevant safeguards and Codes of Practice have
been followed. During each visit I review each of the files and the supporting
documents and discuss the cases with the officers concerned. I can, if I need to,
view the product of interception. It is of paramount importance to ensure that the
facts justified the use of interception in each case and that those concerned with
interception fully understand the safeguards and the Codes of Practice.
2.2 I continue to be impressed by the quality, dedication and enthusiasm of
the personnel carrying out this work. They possess a detailed understanding of
the legislation and are always anxious to ensure that they comply both with the
legislation and the appropriate safeguards. All applications made to the Secretary
of State are scrutinised by officials in the warrants unit within their respective
Departments (e.g., the Home Office, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of
Defence and by similar officers in departments in the Northern Ireland Office and
Scottish Government). They are all skilled in their work and there is very little
danger of any defective application being placed before the Secretary of State. I
will refer in some detail to errors which have occurred during the period under
review. Where errors have occurred, they are errors of detail or procedure and
not of substance. If there is any product obtained through such errors it has been
immediately destroyed. The Agencies always make available to me the personnel
and documents that I have asked to see. They welcome my oversight, as ensuring
that they are acting lawfully, proportionately and appropriately, and they seek my
advice whenever it is deemed appropriate. It is a reassurance to the general public
that their activities are overseen by an independent person who has held high
judicial office. I am left in no doubt at all as to the Agencies’ commitment to
comply with the law. In case of doubt or difficulty, they do not hesitate to contact
me and to seek advice.
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