Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the main part of the Report. I take this
opportunity to emphasise again the reasoning behind this decision.
5.2 This practice is based on paragraph 121 of the Report of the Committee of
Privy Councillors appointed to inquire into the interception of communications
and chaired by Lord Birkett. The Birkett Committee thought that public concern
about interception might to some degree be allayed by the knowledge of the
actual extent to which interception had taken place. After carefully considering
the consequences of disclosure upon the effectiveness of interception as a means
of detection, they decided that it would be in the public interest to publish figures
showing the extent of interception, but to do so only in a way which caused no
damage to the public interest. They went on to say:
“We are strongly of the opinion that it would be wrong for figures to be
disclosed by the Secretary of State at regular or irregular intervals in the
future. It would greatly aid the operation of agencies hostile to the state if
they were able to estimate even approximately the extent of the interceptions
of communications for security purposes.”
5.3 Like my predecessors I am not persuaded that there is any serious risk in the
publication of the number of warrants issued by the Home Secretary and the First
Minister for Scotland. This information does not provide hostile agencies with any
indication of the targets because as Lord Lloyd said in his first Report published
in 1987 “the total includes not only warrants issued in the interest of national
security, but also for the prevention and detection of serious crime.” These figures
are, therefore, set out in paragraph 2.32 of this Report. However, I believe that
the views expressed in Lord Birkett’s Report still apply to the publication of the
number of warrants issued by the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland. I also agree with the view of my predecessor, Lord Nolan,
that the disclosure of this information would be prejudicial to the public interest.
I have, therefore, included them in the Confidential Annex to this Report.
Safeguards
5.4 Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to the dissemination,
disclosing, copying, storage and destruction etc., of intercepted material. These
sections of the legislation require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted
by each of the agencies and for those safeguards to be approved by the Secretary
of State. This has been done. My advice is sought on proposed amendments to
the safeguards when they are updated in the light of technical and administrative
developments. I did not see nor was I asked to comment on any revised handling
arrangements during the period of this Report.
Section 6: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal
Statistics
6.1 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (the Tribunal) was established by section
65 of RIPA. The Tribunal came into being on 2 October 2000 and from that date
assumed responsibility for the jurisdiction previously held by the Interception
of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service Tribunal and the Intelligence
Services Tribunal and the complaints function of the Commissioner appointed
under the Police Act 1997 as well as for claims under the Human Rights Act. The
President of the Tribunal is Lord Justice Mummery with Mr. Justice Burton acting
as Vice-President. In addition, four senior members of the legal profession served
on the Tribunal for the whole of 2009, with four additional new members being
appointed in July 2009.
6.2 As I explained in paragraph 39 of my Annual Report for 2006, complaints to
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal cannot easily be “categorised” under the three
Tribunal systems that existed prior to RIPA. Consequently, I am unable to detail
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