2.20 The third error involved the failure of a desk officer to process the relevant
paperwork to cancel an intercept before the warrant’s expiry date. A period of
12 hours unauthorised interception ensued during which time the user of the
telephone made seven outgoing calls. None of these calls were monitored and all
the product has been deleted.
2.21. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) reported two errors. One of them
concerned a modification for a communication address which was applied for and
authorised. The application was based on information provided by a reliable covert
human intelligence source (CHIS). However, when the product was received it
did not seem to be relevant. Checks by HMRC established that the information
provided by the CHIS was incorrect. Interception was stopped immediately.
HMRC’s internal vetting processes have now been enhanced to prevent similar
recurrences in future.
2.22 The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) reported eight errors, two
of which I detail below.
2.23 The first error involved a warrant where an incorrect number was used
when the warrant was applied for, resulting in an incorrect telephone number
being intercepted. The interception was immediately cancelled and all product
destroyed. The case officer was reminded of his responsibility for checking and
verifying the appropriate telephone numbers prior to submitting applications for
interception.
2.24 The second error involved a warrant where two digits in a telephone number
had mistakenly been transposed before the application was submitted for a warrant.
This resulted in an incorrect telephone number being intercepted. The interception
was cancelled and deleted from the warrant and all the product destroyed.
2.25 The Scottish Government reported one error in respect of an interception
warrant. An application was made to intercept four telephone numbers but it
transpired that when it was signed, the application only contained three telephone
numbers. The warrantry paperwork is normally double-checked against the signed
applications; unfortunately the draft application had been referred to when starting
to intercept, so the fourth number was intercepted. Interception of the fourth line
was suspended as soon as the error came to light, no product having been received.
The relevant staff were reminded of the formal procedures.
2.26 The Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command reported one
error where a warrant was obtained with an incorrect email address. The warrant
was cancelled and all material relating to the communications address was
destroyed. Arrangements were made for future applications to be subjected to
closer scrutiny.
2.27 Three errors attributable to the National Technical Assistance Centre
(NTAC) were reported during the period of this report, one of which I now
explain. NTAC reported a technical fault within their infrastructure that resulted
in the prevention of delivery of intercept related information to the intercepting
agencies for three days. A project to prevent this type of error occurring has been
initiated and is expected to deliver improvements in the system in 2010.
2.28 No errors were reported by the Home Office, Northern Ireland Office/
Police Service of Northern Ireland, Ministry of Defence, the Secret Intelligence
Service or any of the communications service providers.
6