were being intercepted under GCHQ’s RIPA 8(4) warrants travelled to the United
Kingdom for a weekend. GCHQ had concluded that interception during this
period would be of no intelligence value and so did not obtain the appropriate
RIPA authorisation to continue targeting. Because of an incorrect entry in a
database, targeting resumed the day before the person left the UK. Four calls were
selected for listening but were then destroyed.
52. The fourth error arose out of feasibility checking for a selector prior to
adding it to a warrant issued under section 8(1) of RIPA. During the check the
GCHQ analyst found an existing entry for the selector under a specific warrant.
Unfortunately he failed to notice that the latter was not a RIPA interception
warrant and went on to add the selector to a targeting database. The position was
rectified immediately upon discovery. Although 86 items were selected no reports
were issued. The error was as a result of human error. Tasking procedures have
been revised to ensure no recurrence of similar errors.
53. The Security Service reported sixteen errors, brief details of six of these are
highlighted below. In the first case, warrants against a target’s landline and mobile
telephones were cancelled but it transpired that the interception of traffic on the
landline had not been stopped. No product was received. The Service has reexamined its procedures for handling and monitoring interceptions to prevent
similar recurrences.
54. The second error occurred in respect of a modification. A modification was
made to an existing warrant with the modification document itself correctly
recording the telephone number. A copy of the modification was forwarded to the
Home Office. However, the formal application to the Home Office to ratify the
modification, which the Home Office processed and duly provided a signed
modification instrument, contained an error in that digits were incorrectly
transposed. The error was, unfortunately, missed by both the Security Service and
the Home Office.
55. In the third case, the Security Service reported that they had confused two
telephone numbers relevant to an investigation resulting in an intercept warrant
being obtained for an associate of the target rather than the target himself. The
intercept was suspended and the correct telephone number added to the warrant.
No communications were listened to or transcribed and the product was
destroyed.
56. A fourth error occurred when, due to an inputting error on their warrantry
records database, the Security Service failed to request the cancellation of a
warrant. No interception took place after the warrant expired and, unfortunately,
neither the Home Office nor the communication service provider noticed that the
warrant had not been renewed or cancelled.
57. Errors were reported in two separate cases when target telephone numbers
had been mis-transcribed and the numbers placed on interception were incorrect.
The errors were not apparent to the four UK mobile network providers on whom
schedules were served. The interceptions were suspended and the incorrect
numbers deleted. No product was received in either case.
58. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reported an error in that they failed
to report to me, as required by the Code of Practice for the interception of
communications, the fact that some information that was considered to be subject
to legal privilege had been transcribed under a warrant. In light of this error SIS
have amended its administrative processes for the handling of confidential
information whether on legal, religious, journalistic or medical grounds.
59. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) reported one error. The error
occurred when HMRC failed to request a cancellation of a warrant and only did
so after the warrant had expired. HMRC has reviewed its internal systems and has
taken steps to prevent a recurrence. No product was received after the decision
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