and organised crime and an increased facility to counter it are the main cause of
the larger numbers of warrants. The high level of warrants sought each year, with
a corresponding level of workload for the Secretaries of State and on the part of
the relevant agencies, clearly calls for the exercise of vigilant supervision. I can
report that the level of scrutiny has been, and continues to be, generally well
maintained. The number of errors reported to me during 2004 is 45, an increase
of six on the figure of 39 recorded in my Report last year. I remain of the view
that this level of mistakes is still unacceptably high and impress this on the
agencies concerned. They accept this and continue to strive to eliminate or at least
reduce the number. However it is important to record in this context that with the
substantial increase in terrorism and the threat of terrorism, and the increase in
serious crime, so the number of warrants and modifications have, of necessity,
substantially increased. It is, I think, fair to point out, that if, instead of taking raw
numbers, one looks at the number of errors as a percentage of the warrants issued,
the percentage of errors has fallen since my previous reports. This is particularly
true of the Security Service. It is also important to stress that the number of errors
in comparison to the number of warrants is, in percentage terms, very small
indeed. This is not to condone them. The agencies are very aware of the
importance of this, and on each occasion where an error has occurred they review
their procedures with a view to ensuring that the same error does not recur.
Keeping errors to a minimum is one of the reasons for having safeguards in
place. I will, of course, continue to monitor the system to satisfy myself that every
effort is being made to prevent such recurrences and seeking full explanations if
they do.
Safeguards
16. Sections 15 and 16 of RIPA lay a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure
that arrangements are in force as safeguards in relation to the dissemination,
disclosure, copying, storage and destruction etc., of intercepted material. These
sections of the legislation require careful and detailed safeguards to be drafted by
each of the agencies and for those safeguards to be approved by the Secretary of
State. This has been done. My advice and approval was sought for the documents
and I am approached to agree amendments to the safeguards when they are
updated in light of technical and administrative developments.
17. During 2004 I had sight of the revised safeguards documents produced by
the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the Metropolitan Police Special
Branch. I provided my comments on these documents which fully meet the
requirements of section 15 of RIPA.
18. During my visit to Belfast in late 2004 I was shown a copy of the Northern
Ireland Office’s new safeguards document which had been approved by the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 25 October 2004. I have since received
a copy of this document, and they also fully comply with the requirements of
Section 15 of RIPA.
19. The requirements of sections 15 and 16 of RIPA are vital. Those involved in
the interception process are well aware of the invasive nature of this work and care
is taken to ensure that intrusions of privacy are kept to the minimum and that the
proportionality requirements in the warrants are met effectively in practice. I am
satisfied that the agencies are operating effectively within their safeguards.
Communications data
20. Chapter II of Part I of RIPA applies to the acquisition and disclosure of
communications data. Section 57 of the Act requires me to keep under review the
exercise and performance by the persons on whom these powers and duties are
conferred or imposed by or under Chapter II of Part I. The delay in bringing into
force Chapter II of Part I is well documented. The Regulation of Investigatory
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