74
ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
personal data in the police sector, which provides that where data
concerning an individual have been collected and stored without his
knowledge, and unless the data are deleted, he should be informed, where
practicable, that information is held about him as soon as the object of the
police activities is no longer likely to be prejudiced (§ 2.2, see paragraph
143 above).
288. In Klass and Others and Weber and Saravia, the Court examined
German legislation which provided for notification of surveillance as soon
as that could be done after its termination without jeopardising its purpose.
The Court took into account that it was an independent authority, the G10
Commission, which had the power to decide whether an individual being
monitored was to be notified of a surveillance measure. The Court found
that the provision in question ensured an effective notification mechanism
which contributed to keeping the interference with the secrecy of
telecommunications within the limits of what was necessary to achieve the
legitimate aims pursued (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 58, and
Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 136). In Association for European
Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev and Dumitru Popescu, the
Court found that the absence of a requirement to notify the subject of
interception at any point was incompatible with the Convention, in that it
deprived the interception subject of an opportunity to seek redress for
unlawful interferences with his Article 8 rights and rendered the remedies
available under the national law theoretical and illusory rather than practical
and effective. The national law thus eschewed an important safeguard
against the improper use of special means of surveillance (see Association
for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev, cited above,
§§ 90-91, and Dumitru Popescu, cited above, § 77). By contrast, in Kennedy
the absence of a requirement to notify the subject of interception at any
point in time was compatible with the Convention, because in the United
Kingdom any person who suspected that his communications were being or
had been intercepted could apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal,
whose jurisdiction did not depend on notification to the interception subject
that there had been an interception of his communications (see Kennedy,
cited above, § 167).
289. Turning now to the circumstances of the present case, the Court
observes that in Russia persons whose communications have been
intercepted are not notified of this fact at any point or under any
circumstances. It follows that, unless criminal proceedings have been
opened against the interception subject and the intercepted data have been
used in evidence, or unless there has been a leak, the person concerned is
unlikely ever to find out that his communications have been intercepted.
290. The Court takes note of the fact that a person who has somehow
learned that his communications have been intercepted may request
information about the corresponding data (see paragraph 81 above). It is