ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
73
reports are confidential documents. They are not published or otherwise
accessible to the public (see paragraph 80 above). It follows that in Russia
supervision by prosecutors is conducted in a manner which is not open to
public scrutiny and knowledge.
284. Lastly, the Court notes that it is for the Government to illustrate the
practical effectiveness of the supervision arrangements with appropriate
examples (see, mutatis mutandis, Ananyev and Others, cited above,
§§ 109-10). However, they did not submit any inspection reports or
decisions by prosecutors ordering the taking of measures to stop or remedy
a detected breach of law. It follows that the Government did not
demonstrate that prosecutors’ supervision of secret surveillance measures is
effective in practice. The Court also takes note in this connection of the
documents submitted by the applicant illustrating prosecutors’ inability to
obtain access to classified materials relating to interceptions (see
paragraph 14 above). That example also raises doubts as to the effectiveness
of supervision by prosecutors in practice.
285. In view of the defects identified above, and taking into account the
particular importance of supervision in a system where law-enforcement
authorities have direct access to all communications, the Court considers
that the prosecutors’ supervision of interceptions as it is currently organised
is not capable of providing adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.
(η) Notification of interception of communications and available remedies
286. The Court will now turn to the issue of notification of interception
of communications which is inextricably linked to the effectiveness of
remedies before the courts (see the case-law cited in paragraph 234 above).
287. It may not be feasible in practice to require subsequent notification
in all cases. The activity or danger against which a particular series of
surveillance measures is directed may continue for years, even decades,
after the suspension of those measures. Subsequent notification to each
individual affected by a suspended measure might well jeopardise the longterm purpose that originally prompted the surveillance. Furthermore, such
notification might serve to reveal the working methods and fields of
operation of the intelligence services and even possibly to identify their
agents. Therefore, the fact that persons concerned by secret surveillance
measures are not subsequently notified once surveillance has ceased cannot
by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not “necessary in a
democratic society”, as it is the very absence of knowledge of surveillance
which ensures the efficacy of the interference. As soon as notification can
be carried out without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction after the
termination of the surveillance measure, information should, however, be
provided to the persons concerned (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 58,
and Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 135). The Court also takes note of
the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers regulating the use of