72
ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
undercover agents, and about the tactics, methods and means used by them,
is outside the scope of prosecutors’ supervision (see paragraph 74 above).
The scope of their supervision is therefore limited. Moreover, interceptions
performed by the FSB in the sphere of counter-intelligence may be
inspected only following an individual complaint (see paragraph 76 above).
As individuals are not notified of interceptions (see paragraph 81 above and
paragraph 289 below), it is unlikely that such a complaint will ever be
lodged. As a result, surveillance measures related to counter-intelligence de
facto escape supervision by prosecutors.
282. The supervisory body’s powers with respect to any breaches
detected are also an important element for the assessment of the
effectiveness of its supervision (see, for example, Klass and Others, cited
above, § 53, where the intercepting agency was required to terminate the
interception immediately if the G10 Commission found it illegal or
unnecessary; and Kennedy, cited above, § 168, where any intercept material
was to be destroyed as soon as the Interception of Communications
Commissioner discovered that the interception was unlawful). The Court is
satisfied that prosecutors have certain powers with respect to the breaches
detected by them. Thus, they may take measures to stop or remedy the
detected breaches of law and to bring those responsible to account
(see paragraph 79 above). However, there is no specific provision requiring
destruction of the unlawfully obtained intercept material (see Kennedy, cited
above, § 168).
283. The Court must also examine whether the supervisory body’s
activities are open to public scrutiny (see, for example, L. v. Norway, cited
above, where the supervision was performed by the Control Committee,
which reported annually to the government and whose reports were
published and discussed by Parliament; Kennedy, cited above, § 166, where
the supervision of interceptions was performed by the Interception of
Communications Commissioner, who reported annually to the Prime
Minister, his report being a public document laid before Parliament; and, by
contrast, Association for European Integration and Human Rights and
Ekimdzhiev, cited above, § 88, where the Court found fault with the system
where neither the Minister for Internal Affairs nor any other official was
required to report regularly to an independent body or to the general public
on the overall operation of the system or on the measures applied in
individual cases). In Russia, prosecutors must submit biannual reports
detailing the results of the inspections to the Prosecutor General’s Office.
However, these reports concern all types of operational-search measures,
amalgamated together, without interceptions being treated separately from
other measures. Moreover, the reports contain only statistical information
about the number of inspections of operational-search measures carried out
and the number of breaches detected, without specifying the nature of the
breaches or the measures taken to remedy them. It is also significant that the