ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
71
members of the supervisory body. In particular, it found sufficiently
independent bodies composed of members of parliament of both the
majority and the opposition, or of persons qualified to hold judicial office,
appointed either by Parliament or by the Prime Minister (see, for example,
Klass and Others, cited above, §§ 21 and 56; Weber and Saravia, cited
above, §§ 24-25 and 117; Leander, cited above, § 65; L. v. Norway,
no. 13564/88, Commission decision of 8 June 1990, Decisions and
Reports 65; and Kennedy, cited above, §§ 57 and 166). In contrast, a
Minister for Internal Affairs – who was not only a political appointee and a
member of the executive, but also directly involved in the commissioning of
special means of surveillance – was found to be insufficiently independent
(see Association for European Integration and Human Rights and
Ekimdzhiev, cited above, §§ 85 and 87). Similarly, a Prosecutor General and
competent lower-level prosecutors were also found to be insufficiently
independent (see Iordachi and Others, cited above, § 47).
279. In contrast to the supervisory bodies cited above, in Russia
prosecutors are appointed and dismissed by the Prosecutor General after
consultation with the regional executive authorities (see paragraph 70
above). This fact may raise doubts as to their independence from the
executive.
280. Furthermore, it is essential that any role prosecutors have in the
general protection of human rights does not give rise to any conflict of
interest (see Menchinskaya v. Russia, no. 42454/02, §§ 19 and 38,
15 January 2009). The Court observes that prosecutor’s offices do not
specialise in supervision of interceptions (see paragraph 71 above). Such
supervision is only one part of their broad and diversified functions, which
include prosecution and supervision of criminal investigations. In the
framework of their prosecuting functions, prosecutors give their approval to
all interception requests lodged by investigators in the framework of
criminal proceedings (see paragraph 44 above). This blending of functions
within one prosecutor’s office, with the same office giving approval to
requests for interceptions and then supervising their implementation, may
also raise doubts as to prosecutors’ independence (see, by way of contrast,
Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, § 215,
10 January 2012, concerning supervision by prosecutors of detention
facilities, where it was found that prosecutors complied with the
requirement of independence vis-à-vis the penitentiary system’s bodies).
281. Turning now to the prosecutors’ powers and competences, the
Court notes that it is essential that the supervisory body has access to all
relevant documents, including closed materials and that all those involved in
interception activities have a duty to disclose to it any material it required
(see Kennedy, cited above, § 166). Russian law stipulates that prosecutors
are entitled to study relevant documents, including confidential ones. It is,
however, important to note that information about the security services’