70
ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
supervision arrangements existing in Russia are capable of ensuring that the
statutory requirements relating to the implementation of the surveillance
measures, the storage, access to, use, processing, communication and
destruction of intercept material are routinely respected.
274. A court which has granted authorisation for interception has no
competence to supervise its implementation. It is not informed of the results
of the interceptions and has no power to review whether the requirements of
the decision granting authorisation were complied with. Nor do Russian
courts in general have competence to carry out the overall supervision of
interceptions. Judicial supervision is limited to the initial authorisation
stage. Subsequent supervision is entrusted to the President, Parliament, the
government, the Prosecutor General and competent lower-level prosecutors.
275. The Court has earlier found that, although it is in principle desirable
to entrust supervisory control to a judge, supervision by non-judicial bodies
may be considered compatible with the Convention, provided that the
supervisory body is independent of the authorities carrying out the
surveillance, and is vested with sufficient powers and competence to
exercise an effective and continuous control (see Klass and Others, cited
above, § 56).
276. As far as the President, Parliament and the Government are
concerned, Russian law does not set out the manner in which they may
supervise interceptions. There are no publicly available regulations or
instructions describing the scope of their review, the conditions under which
it may be carried out, the procedures for reviewing the surveillance
measures or for remedying the breaches detected (see, for similar reasoning,
Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev,
cited above, § 88).
277. As regards supervision of interceptions by prosecutors, the Court
observes that domestic law sets out the scope of, and the procedures for,
prosecutors’
supervision
of
operational-search
activities
(see
paragraphs 69-80 above). It stipulates that prosecutors may carry out routine
and ad hoc inspections of agencies performing operational-search activities
and are entitled to study the relevant documents, including confidential
ones. They may take measures to stop or remedy the detected breaches of
law and to bring those responsible to account. They must submit biannual
reports detailing the results of the inspections to the Prosecutor General’s
Office. The Court accepts that a legal framework exists which provides, at
least in theory, for some supervision by prosecutors of secret surveillance
measures. It must next be examined whether the prosecutors are
independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and are vested
with sufficient powers and competence to exercise effective and continuous
control.
278. As to the independence requirement, in previous cases the Court
has taken into account the manner of appointment and the legal status of the