ROMAN ZAKHAROV v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
63
of prior judicial authorisation constitutes an important safeguard against
arbitrariness. The effectiveness of that safeguard will be examined below.
(γ) The duration of secret surveillance measures
250. The Court has held that it is not unreasonable to leave the overall
duration of interception to the discretion of the relevant domestic authorities
which have competence to issue and renew interception warrants, provided
that adequate safeguards exist, such as a clear indication in the domestic law
of the period after which an interception warrant will expire, the conditions
under which a warrant can be renewed and the circumstances in which it
must be cancelled (see Kennedy, cited above, § 161; see also Klass and
Others, cited above, § 52, and Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 98).
251. As regards the first safeguard, both the CCrP and the OSAA
provide that interceptions may be authorised by a judge for a period not
exceeding six months (see paragraphs 38 and 47 above). There is therefore a
clear indication in the domestic law of the period after which an interception
authorisation will expire. Secondly, the conditions under which an
authorisation can be renewed are also clearly set out in law. In particular,
under both the CCrP and the OSAA a judge may extend interception for a
maximum of six months at a time, after a fresh examination of all the
relevant materials (ibid.). However, as regards the third safeguard
concerning the circumstances in which the interception must be
discontinued, the Court notes that the requirement to discontinue
interception when no longer necessary is mentioned in the CCrP only.
Regrettably, the OSAA does not contain such a requirement (ibid.). In
practice, this means that interceptions in the framework of criminal
proceedings are attended by more safeguards than interceptions conducted
outside such a framework, in particular in connection with “events or
activities endangering national, military, economic or ecological security”.
252. The Court concludes from the above that, while Russian law
contains clear rules on the duration and renewal of interceptions providing
adequate safeguards against abuse, the OSAA provisions on discontinuing
surveillance measures do not provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrary
interference.
(δ) Procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using,
communicating and destroying the intercepted data
253. Russian law stipulates that data collected as a result of secret
surveillance measures constitute a State secret and are to be sealed and
stored under conditions excluding any risk of unauthorised access. They
may be disclosed to those State officials who genuinely need the data for the
performance of their duties and have the appropriate level of security
clearance. Steps must be taken to ensure that only the amount of
information needed by the recipient to perform his duties is disclosed, and